...the recent case law (arrrgh!! i can't find it laying around but i just saw the case)....says only for limited times and under limited circumstances with numerous provisos....i have pasted in two cases below...

...after reading them you can do some free research with the case "cites" ....here...but first look at these as a starting point and then check for the more recent precedents (ie cases) and THERE ARE A FEW... sorry if this is not a full explanation but you'll find lots of info in the cases below and good starting point if you want to do the research etc and risk it alone if it ends up being a grey area on your full personal circumstances and of the child your spouse etc....

....here is one of my cases on step parents and child support, this was the only case that was laying around on my computer's "desktop" but there are a bunch more but i'd have to rummage a bit ...

history of family expense statute

--===Washington State Courts - Opinions===--

_Washington State Supreme Court

 Opinions: Edward Harmon v. Department of Social &Health Services _

Supreme Court of the State of Washington                                       

                            Opinion Information Sheet                         

Docket Number:       64800-0                                                  

Title of Case:       Edward Harmon                                            

                     v.                                                       

                     Department of Social & Health Services                   

File Date:           02/26/98                                                 

Oral Argument Date:  06/11/97                                                 

                                SOURCE OF APPEAL                               

                                ----------------                              

Appeal from Superior Court,                                                   

            Snohomish County;                                                 

            93-2-05856-8                                                      

            Honorable Joseph Thibodeau, Judge.                                

                                    JUSTICES                                  

                                    --------                                  

Authored by Richard P. Guy                                                    

Concurring: Barbara Durham                                                    

            James M. Dolliver                                                  

            Charles Z. Smith                                                  

            Charles W. Johnson                                                

            Barbara A. Madsen                                                 

            Richard B. Sanders                                                

Dissenting: Philip A. Talmadge                                                 

            Gerry L. Alexander                                                

                                COUNSEL OF RECORD                             

                                -----------------                              

Counsel for Petitioner(s)                                                     

            John R. Quirk                                                      

            211 14th Ave. East                                                

            Seattle, WA  98112-5223                                           

Counsel for Respondent(s)                                                     

            Michael S. Majors                                                  

            Offc of Attny General                                             

            2722 Colby Avenue, #200                                           

            Everett, WA  98201-3527                                           

Counsel for Respondent Intervenor(s)                                           

            Gregory J. Kopta                                                  

            Davis Wright Tremaine                                             

            2600 Century Sq                                                   

            1501 4th Ave                                                      

            Seattle, WA  98101-1662                                            

Amicus Curiae on behalf of David E Engdahl                                    

            David E. Engdahl                                                  

            Pro Se                                                            

            950 Broadway Plaza                                                

            Tacoma, Wa, WA  98402                                             

Amicus Curiae on behalf of William C Oltman                                   

            William C. Oltman                                                 

            950 Broadway                                                      

            Tacoma, WA  98402-4405                                            

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON                               

EDWARD HARMON,                                   )                             

                                                 ) No. 64800-0                

               Appellant,                        )                            

                                                 )                            

          v.                                     )                            

                                                 ) EN BANC                     

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND                         )                            

HEALTH SERVICES, STATE OF                        )                            

WASHINGTON,                                      )                            

                                                 )                            

               Respondent.                       ) Filed February 26, 1998.   

     GUY, J.   In this appeal we are asked to determine whether the family    

expense statute, RCW 26.16.205, imposes a child support obligation on a       

stepparent which is equal to that of the child's mother and father and        

which continues after the child leaves the family home.  We hold RCW          

26.16.205 is                                                                  

not a self-contained and autonomous child support statute.  It may not be     

used independent of the standards, guidelines and schedule the Legislature    

has enacted to govern child support liability and computation in this         

state.  See RCW 26.19 (Washington Child Support Schedule).                    

     Prior law enabled the Department of Social and Health Services to look   

to the stepparent and to rely upon the stepparent's income when determining   

a child support obligation.  See former RCW 74.20A.055 (amended by Laws of    

1991, ch. 367, sec. 46), RCW 74.20A.020 and RCW 26.16.205.  However, with     

the enactment of this state's child support schedule and standards in 1988,   

the Legislature made a policy decision to impose the primary child support    

obligation on the child's natural parents and therefore provided that the     

basic child support obligation is to be calculated without reference to a     

stepparent's income.                                                           

     Our child support guidelines and standards do not permit an agency or    

court to substitute a stepparent for a parent when determining the basic      

child support obligation.  In this case, the family expense statute should    

not have been used to impose a primary financial responsibility on a          

stepfather for the support of stepchildren who were in the residential care   

of their father and stepmother.  Accordingly, we reverse.                     

FACTS                                                                         

     Appellant Edward Harmon married Darlene Dooley in 1985.  At that time    

Darlene was the custodial parent1 of two daughters, ages eight and nine       

years old, who were born during her marriage to Tom Dooley.                    

     After living with their mother and stepfather for almost seven years,    

both children left the Harmon home in February 1992 and moved into the home   

of their father and stepmother, Tom and Linda Dooley.                         

      On March 31, 1992, the superior court modified custody of the           

children, ordering the primary residential placement of the children be        

changed from the mother's home to the father's home.  The modification        

order did not address child support.  In April 1992, the children's father    

requested the Department of Social and Health Services (hereafter             

Department) to calculate and collect support payments for the children        

pursuant to RCW 74.20A.  The Department initially served only the mother      

with a "Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility," and she requested    

a hearing.  The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined the mother was      

permanently disabled and had no ability to earn income.  Based on this        

state's child support schedule, RCW 26.19.020, the ALJ ordered the mother     

to pay $25 per child per month.2                                              

     Shortly after the proceeding against the mother was concluded, the       

Department served the stepfather, Appellant Edward Harmon, with a "Notice     

and Finding of Financial Responsibility."                                     

     At an administrative hearing held to contest this finding, the ALJ       

dismissed the Department's finding of financial responsibility and held the   

stepfather had no obligation to support his stepchildren once they left his   

home.  However, "to avoid possible remand and rehearing," the ALJ completed   

the child support schedule worksheets and calculated the amount the           

stepfather would owe as child support, in the event the ALJ's decision were   

reversed.  Using the incomes of Mr. Harmon and Mr. Dooley, the ALJ altered    

the printed Child Support Schedule Worksheets by changing the designations    

under Part I (Basic Support Obligation) from "FATHER" and "MOTHER" to "Step-  

FATHER" and "Nat. FATHER."  Clerk's Papers at 49.  Then, based on the net     

incomes of the stepfather and father, the ALJ computed the stepfather's       

total monthly support obligation (should he be found to be liable on          

appeal) to be $486.10.  The stepfather is disabled and unemployed.  His       

monthly net income of $1,320.20 is received from Department of Labor and      

Industries and Social Security Administration disability payments.            

     The Department petitioned for administrative review of the ALJ's         

ruling that the stepfather was not liable.  The Department's Review Judge     

reversed and held the stepfather was liable for support under RCW 26.16.205   

of the community property statute, and that his liability could be            

terminated, pursuant to that statute, only by legal separation, marriage      

dissolution, or death.  The Review Judge ordered the stepfather to pay        

support in the amount of $486.10 per month.  In addition, the Review Judge    

determined the stepfather owed an accrued child support debt of $8,701.19.    

     The stepfather appealed to the Snohomish County Superior Court, which    

affirmed the Review Judge's decision.3  The Court of Appeals affirmed the     

Superior Court.  Harmon v. Department of Soc. & Health Svcs., 83 Wn. App.      

596, 922 P.2d 201 (1996).  In its decision, the Court of Appeals held RCW     

26.16.205 is plain and unambiguous and that it requires custodial             

stepparents to contribute to their stepchildren's support until divorce,      

legal separation, or death.  Harmon, 83 Wn. App. at 598.  The Court of        

Appeals rejected a contrary interpretation of the statute set forth in In     

re Marriage of Farrell, 67 Wn. App. 361, 835 P.2d 267 (1992).  We accepted    

review of the case to resolve the conflict between Farrell and Harmon.4       

ISSUE                                                                         

     Does RCW 26.16.205 impose an obligation upon a stepparent which is       

equal to that of the natural mother and father for the purpose of             

calculating and paying child support for stepchildren who have moved from     

the stepparent's home?                                                         

ANALYSIS                                                                      

     Our review in this case is governed by the Administrative Procedure      

Act, RCW 34.05, which permits reversal if the agency has erroneously          

interpreted or applied the law.  RCW 34.05.570(3)(d); Tapper v. Employment    

Sec. Dep't, 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993).  Where, as here, the     

issue is one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.  Clauson     

v. Department of Labor & Indus., 130 Wn.2d 580, 583, 925 P.2d 624 (1996).     

     In determining the meaning of a statute, we apply general principles     

of statutory construction.  These principles begin with the premise that if   

a statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the      

language of the statute itself.  State v. Mollichi, 132 Wn.2d 80, 87, 936     

P.2d 408 (1997); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43   

(1996).  Ambiguity exists if the language of a statute is susceptible to      

more than one reasonable interpretation.  Vashon Island Comm. for Self-       

Gov't v. Washington State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d   

953 (1995).  If a statute is ambiguous, resort to the tools of statutory      

construction is appropriate.  State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 601-02, 925       

P.2d 978 (1996).  In such cases, our primary duty is to ascertain and give    

effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature.  State v. Hennings,      

129 Wn.2d 512, 522, 919 P.2d 580 (1996).  In construing a statute, we may     

look to the legislative history of the statute as well as to other statutes   

dealing with the same subject matter in order to discern legislative          

intent.  Washington Pub. Util. Dists.' Utils. Sys. v. Public Util. Dist. 1,   

112 Wn.2d 1, 7, 771 P.2d 701 (1989).                                          

     As the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals decision in Harmon     

points out, the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals in Farrell      

and Harmon are both reasonable interpretations of the family expense           

statute.  Harmon, 83 Wn. App. at 604 (Agid, J., concurring in result).  We    

determine that the statute, RCW 26.16.205, is ambiguous.                      

     A review of the history of RCW 26.16.205 and of related child support    

and family law developments in Washington further illustrates the ambiguity   

of this statute and is helpful in ascertaining and understanding              

legislative intent.                                                           

     RCW 26.16.205, the statute involved here, is part of our community       

property law.  First enacted in 1881, the original purpose of the law was     

to make husbands and wives equally responsible for the necessary expenses     

of their families and the education of their children.  Haddad v. Chapin,     

153 Wash. 163, 164-65, 279 P. 583 (1929).  The statute was enacted in         

derogation of common law, under which a husband was primarily responsible     

and a wife only secondarily responsible for the expenses of the family.5      

See Scott v. Holcomb, 49 Wn.2d 387, 390, 301 P.2d 1068 (1956) (quoting        

Hector v. Hector, 51 Wash. 434, 439, 99 P. 13 (1909)); Hughes v. Hughes, 11   

Wn. App. 454, 457-58, 524 P.2d 472 (1974).  Under this statute, a mother      

and a father were equally obligated for the necessary expenses of child       

rearing, and this obligation survived the termination of the marriage.        

Scott, 49 Wn.2d at 389 (unless otherwise provided in the divorce decree, a    

mother who has had custody of the children may recover from their father no   

more than one-half the amount she has expended in maintaining them).          

     RCW 26.16.205, the family expense statute, remained unchanged for        

nearly 90 years, until 1969, when, at the request of the Department of        

Public Assistance,6 the law was amended as follows:                           

     The expenses of the family and the education of the children,            

including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband      

and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued         

jointly or separately: PROVIDED, That with regard to stepchildren, the        

obligation shall cease upon the termination of the relationship of husband    

and wife.                                                                     

Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, sec. 1.                                 

     The Department explained to the Legislature that the purpose of the      

proposed amendment to the community property law was to comply with federal   

regulations governing allocation of federal public assistance funds to the    

State.  In determining eligibility for public assistance, the Department      

treated a child who lived with a stepparent and one of his or her parents     

in the same manner as it treated a child who lived with both natural           

parents.  See Washington Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wn.2d     

564, 569-70, 536 P.2d 1202, 75 A.L.R.3d 1119 (1975).  In order to continue    

this practice, federal regulations required that all stepparents, not just    

those on public assistance, be treated the same, under a law of general       

application.7  Documentation in the House of Representatives Committee file   

shows the Department explained to the Legislature that the proposed bill      

was "strictly a money bill," and that it would not have been proposed if      

the Department did not believe the bill would save the State approximately    

$6.5 million in federal aid during the 1969-71 biennium.8                     

     RCW 26.16.205 was not amended again until 1990.  Between the two         

amendments, significant legislative changes occurred in the area of family    

law in Washington, and a number of appellate court decisions interpreted      

the existing family expense statute.                                          

     Legislative changes included the adoption, in 1973, of the Uniform       

Marriage and Divorce Act.  Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 157 (codified     

at RCW 26.09).  This statute permits dissolution of a marriage without        

regard to fault of either party.                                               

The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act gave the trial judge discretion to       

determine the amount of child support, based on a consideration of "all       

relevant factors."  Former RCW 26.09.100.                                     

     RCW 74.20A.055 also was enacted in 1973.  Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess.,   

ch. 183, sec. 25.  This statute authorized the Department of Social and       

Health Services to determine child support obligations of a "responsible      

parent" whose child was receiving services from the Department.  RCW 74.20A   

was amended in 1979 to include stepparents within the definition of           

"responsible parent."  Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 171, sec. 3(5).       

Before 1988, and the enactment of the Child Support Schedule, RCW 26.19,      

the Department was authorized, pursuant to former RCW 74.20A.055(6), to       

base child support orders on the earnings and resources of any "responsible   

parent."                                                                      

     In 1987, the Parenting Act,  Laws of 1987, ch. 460 (primarily codified   

within RCW 26.09), was enacted in an attempt to lessen the conflict between   

parents whose marriage was being dissolved and to provide guidelines for      

the continued involvement of parents in their children's lives following      

the breakup of the family.  See In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795,      

800, 854 P.2d 629 (1993).                                                     

     Also in 1987, the Legislature established the Washington State Child     

Support Schedule Commission, which was charged with recommending a            

statewide child support schedule.  Laws of 1987, ch. 440.9  The following     

year, the Legislature enacted the statewide child support schedule and        

guidelines recommended by that Commission.  Laws of 1988, ch. 275.  The       

schedule was revised two years later in an enactment that also amended RCW    

26.16.205, the family expense statute.  Laws of 1990, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 2.   

     During this same period of time, from 1969 to 1990, this court and the   

Court of Appeals interpreted RCW 26.16.205 in light of the common law         

doctrine of in loco parentis and in light of various factual settings.        

Unfortunately, the results of our decisions and those of the Court of         

Appeals have not produced a consistent rule.                                  

     We first reviewed the 1969 amendment to RCW 26.16.205 in Washington      

Statewide Org. of Stepparents, a class action in which this court was asked   

to hold RCW 26.16.205 unconstitutional.  We upheld the constitutionality of   

the statute but did not determine whether RCW 26.16.205 applied to a          

stepparent whose stepchild did not reside in the stepparent's home.           

Stepparents, 85 Wn.2d at 565 n.2.                                             

     In Van Dyke v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981), we           

answered the question whether the statute applied to a stepfather who had     

never lived with his stepchild.  We rejected a Department of Social and       

Health Services' argument that RCW 26.16.205 created obligations between      

stepparents and stepchildren that were equal to those between natural         

parents and their children and held that the family expense statute did not   

apply to a noncustodial stepfather.  In Van Dyke we held that RCW 26.16.205    

was consistent with and a codification of the common law principle that       

only a stepparent standing in loco parentis was required to contribute to     

the needs of a stepchild.  Van Dyke, 95 Wn.2d at 728-29.  See also In re      

the Marriage of Schweitzer, 132 Wn.2d 318, 331, 937 P.2d 1062 (1997)          

(citing to Van Dyke for the rule that a noncustodial stepparent is not        

required to support a stepchild, the court held a stepfather had no legal     

obligation to support his stepchild after the child left home).  Because      

Van Dyke held the stepfather in that case did not have a duty to support      

the child, it did not interpret the language of the statute with respect to   

termination of that duty.                                                     

     In In re Montell, 54 Wn. App. 708, 775 P.2d 976 (1989), the Court of     

Appeals held the statute did not apply to a stepfather who, with his wife,    

cared for his wife's children for two years while the children's father and   

legal custodian was in prison.  The Court of Appeals, applying common law     

principles, held that the stepfather did not stand in loco parentis to the    

children because he never intended to have the children reside with him       

permanently and did not intend to take on the responsibility of a custodial   

stepparent.  At common law the status of one standing in loco parentis is     

voluntary and temporary and may be abrogated at will by either the person     

standing in loco parentis or by the child.  Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wn.2d 510,   

513, 364 P.2d 444 (1961).                                                     

     In Komm v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 23 Wn. App. 593, 597      

P.2d 1372 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that a child support obligation   

owed to the State for foster care expenses for two children who were          

removed from the mother and stepfather's care and placed in foster care was   

a community debt that could be collected out of the earnings of the           

stepfather.                                                                   

     In three cases, the Court of Appeals interpreted RCW 26.16.205 as        

requiring a stepparent to contribute to the support of stepchildren after     

separation but before dissolution of the marriage between the custodial       

parent and the stepparent.  Stahl v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 43   

Wn. App. 401, 717 P.2d 320 (1986) (obligation to support stepchildren         

continues until marriage is legally dissolved); Groves v. Department of       

Soc. & Health Servs., 42 Wn. App. 84, 709 P.2d 1213 (1985) (same); State v.   

Gillaspie, 8 Wn. App. 560, 507 P.2d 1223 (1973) (stepfather who had           

separated from stepchild's mother was charged under criminal nonsupport       

statute, former RCW 26.20.030(1)(b)).                                         

     The Legislature again amended RCW 26.16.205 in 1990. That amendment      

permits a trial court to terminate a stepparent's obligation under the         

family expense statute after a petition for marriage dissolution has been     

filed.  The amendment also clarifies that termination of the husband and      

wife relationship includes legal separation as well as dissolution and        

death.  Laws of 1990, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 2, sec. 13.                          

     The statute, as amended in 1990, now provides:                           

     The expenses of the family and the education of the children,            

including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband      

and wife, or either of them, and they may be sued jointly or separately.      

When a petition for dissolution of marriage or a petition for legal           

separation is filed, the court may, upon motion of the stepparent,            

terminate the obligation to support the stepchildren.  The obligation to      

support stepchildren shall cease upon the entry of a decree of dissolution,   

decree of legal separation, or death.                                         

RCW 26.16.205.                                                                

     In 1992, the Court of Appeals decided In re Marriage of Farrell, the     

decision which is in conflict with the Court of Appeals' decision in the      

present case.  In Farrell,  Michelle Spencer, the teenage daughter of Irene   

Spencer, left the family home of her mother and stepfather, claiming her      

stepfather was mistreating her.  She sought refuge with Sandra and Robert     

Brewer, a couple who later agreed to become Michelle's custodians.  The       

Brewers filed a third-party custody action under RCW 26.10 and were awarded   

custody of Michelle in an agreed order.  Child support was not mentioned in   

the custody order, and the Brewers later sought child support from both       

natural parents and from the stepfather.  The trial court held the            

stepfather was equally obligated, with both parents, for Michelle's